to their constituents at the ballot box. 8 Yet they exercise profound influence over the outcome of our elections. 9 In fact, "their interests" all too often "conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters."
10
In 1931, the late commercial-law scholar Maurice Wormser authored Frankenstein, Incorporated, a tome that compares the modern corporation to Mary Shelley's gothic beast-an "artificially created and vitalized . . . monster which became the terror of 'all living things. '" 11 Likewise, "[c]orporations are not natural living persons, but artificial beings, corpora ficta. They are created by the nation or state, which endows them with distinct personality in the eye of the law, special privileges and comprehensive powers."
12 And just as "Frankenstein's creature developed into a deadly menace to its creator," Wormser prophetically warned that if efforts were not undertaken to "curb certain grave and vicious abuses" we, like Shelley's nineteenth century anti-hero, will find ourselves at the mercy of our "corporate offspring," which "like a cancerous growth," threatens to "poison the body politic." , dissenting) (The influence that corporations currently possess in the political process "threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation."). 10 Id. at 394. 11 I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED v (1931) . 12 Id. 13 Id. at vi. 14 Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. Recognizing that "the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation," the pre-Citizens United case law recognized that the Constitution permitted the Government to limit for-profit corporations' aggregate political expenditures. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197, 209-10 (1982) . These limits were viewed as necessary to protect the electoral process from "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form." Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990) . Precedent recognized that such protections are particularly important because for-profit corporations' ability to impact the outcome of elections has "little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporations' political ideas." Id. The Citizens United Court repudiated this well-settled anti-distortion principle and struck down federal laws restricting independent political expenditures by for-profit corporations. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. In Citizens United's aftermath, the United States' elector system has witnessed unprecedented "[i]ncreased outside spending" which has "exacerbate[d] the 'polarizing, attack orientation of contemporary political advertising'" and "heighten[ed] the potential capture of officials by interest groups-long the central concern of campaign finance regulation." Garrick B. Pursley, The Campaign Finance Safeguards of Federalism, applies only to mortals. Hobby Lobby says closely held for-profit corporations can do both at the same time. 17 The decision also makes it much harder for the employees of such entities to honor their own religious precepts. I make my living formulating and expounding ideas-usually controversial ones. 18 )). In support of this argument, the Court disingenuously asserted that "RFRA's 'least restrictive means requirement was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify.'" Id. (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 509). This is not so. The Sherbert line of cases explicitly recognized that governmental impairment of an individual's religious exercise can only be justified "by showing that" the governmental action "is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) . 34 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. "As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the By recognizing for the first time that the right to exercise religion can exempt a for-profit corporation from laws governing its obligations to its employees, the Court has opened a Pandora's box that undermines the stability of laws prohibiting employment discrimination and sexual harassment, and ultimately threatens the free-exercise rights of employees whose religious convictions differ from those of their employers. As a former professor of mine observed, by putting an employer's free-exercise rights above its employees, Hobby Lobby sent the clear message "that more money buys you more religious freedom-and more freedom to infringe on the choices of others." The Sherbert line of cases that RFRA reinvigorated expressly recognized this distinction. "When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity." 46 Granting exemptions from neutral and generally applicable statutes governing obligations to employees "operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees."
47
But Hobby Lobby eviscerates this distinction. Half-heartedly acknowledging the historical principle that "nonprofit corporations are special because furthering their religious 'autonomy often furthers individual religious freedom as well,'" the Court asserts that "this principle applies equally to for-profit corporations: furthering their religious freedom also 'furthers individual religious freedom.'" 48 The revolution that began 41 Id. 42 Id. at 634-35; accord United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) ("When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity."). 43 with Citizens United thus reached its logical conclusion. 49 Hobby Lobby similarly concluded that the "profit-making objective" no longer provides a valid justification for distinguishing corporate First Amendment rights.
50
The Court proffers this remarkable proposition without any acknowledgment of its earth-shifting consequences.
51
If for-profit corporations enjoy the same free-exercise rights as their non-profit counterparts, do they not also have the right to disassociate themselves from employees (and customers) that do not embody their religious beliefs; to fire those who exercise their rights to worship (or not worship), to vote, or to speak in a manner that contradicts the employer's religious convictions; to deny service to patrons they view as unclean? Yet courts uniformly recognized that by "engag[ing] in business for profit" a corporation has "passed over the line that affords them" the right to consider religion when making hiring or promotional decisions. 57 Hobby Lobby has erased this line. The Court's logic suggests that compelling a fundamentalist-run enterprise like Hobby Lobby to employ an otherwise-qualified, yarmulkewearing Orthodox Jew or headscarf-wearing Muslim, at the very least, interferes with the exercise of a sincerely held belief. 58 At a minimum, this 54 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (emphases added). 55 As Justice Alito averred, advocating the Christian Legal Society's right to limit membership to those of its own denomination:
Not all Christian denominations agree with CLS's views on sexual morality and other matters. During a recent year, CLS had seven members. Suppose that 10 students who are members of denominations that disagree with CLS decided that CLS was misrepresenting true Christian doctrine. Suppose that these students joined CLS, elected officers who shared their views, ended the group's affiliation with the national organization, and changed the group's message. The new leadership would likely proclaim that the group was "vital" but rectified, while CLS, I assume, would take the view that the old group had suffered its "demise. means that to enforce federal laws preventing a closely held for-profit corporation from terminating an employee on the basis of her faith, the Government must establish that the measure furthers "a compelling interest," and that the requested remedy constitutes "the least restrictive means of achieving that interest"-strict scrutiny-"the most demanding test known to constitutional law." 59 But I enjoy a privilege shared by very few American workers: I am blessed to be part of a profession that embraces the concept of academic freedom. 66 The first rule of the legal academy is that I can express my opinions-political, religious, and otherwise-free of fear that my employment will be threatened because my views do not comport with the sensibilities of my employer. . Censuring LSU for violating the tenets of academic freedom, AAUP observed that the "University's level of tolerance for speech that people may find offensive . . . seems astonishingly low . . . ." Id.
72 As a private "expressive association," AALS enjoys a First Amendment right to disassociate itself from law schools that do not abide by its academic freedom and antidiscrimination rules-to expel those who "may impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express." Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) . Because "any reputable law school must seek to belong" to AALS, the organization's membership rules constitute de facto requirements for all United States law schools. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Dent, supra note 68, at 167 (noting that "AALS standards are de facto mandatory for serious law schools"). . 74 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 697 (2012) ("Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister . . . intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs."). discrimination laws, the club asserted that the Free-Exercise Clause insulated it from liability. Lobby, a for-profit born-again Christian enterprise not only has the power to command an Orthodox Jewish employee to remove his yarmulke, it may also, as a term of his employment, have the "right" to compel him to replace it with a crucifix. While this "right"-one that has never before been recognized in the 239 year history of our Republic 97 -may incrementally expand corporate religious freedom, it does so at the expense of the religious freedom of employees and patrons of these businesses. Hobby Lobby's exemption from a generally applicable federal law governing employee health care plans illustrates this problem. 98 Hobby Lobby is about much more than birth control. Among the highest prerogatives recognized by my faith is the obligation of parents to care for their children. 99 98 See supra note 15. 99 1983 CODE OF CANON LAW c.1136 (1st ed. 1999) ("Parents have the most grave duty and the primary right to take care as best they can for the physical, social, cultural, moral, and religious education of their offspring."). 100 Matthew 2:13-15 (New American Bible). 101 Catholic teaching recognizes that "parents . . . have a moral obligation to protect the life and health of their children." FAQ on the Use of Vaccines, NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS CTR., http://ncbcenter.org/page.aspx?pid=1284 / (last visited Jan. 30, 2016). And when no alternative treatment is available to protect their children from dangerous diseases, this can even necessitate inoculating their children with vaccines having a "historical association with abortion." Id. This is so because "the risk to public health, if one chooses not to
